A committee of experts votes between a complex, multi-attribute alternative and status quo. Each expert is a biased specialist who can privately evaluate only one attribute and puts more weight on it. We study whether an uninformed principal who values all attributes of the alternative would compose the committee of more or less biased experts. We find that her optimal composition depends non-monotonically on the majority rule to manage strategic voting in the committee and use it to her advantage. We then show that the committee composition is less effective if some members can be uninformed, as they induce the informed to always vote sincerely. Nevertheless, the principal may prefer to have some uninformed members, perhaps by rushing the vote on the alternative, when the committee is large, or its composition is suboptimal. By the same logic, the principal may appoint a smaller committee than the alternative requires for a fully informed decision.
Introduction
Decision-making by committee is commonplace. Examples range from job recruitments and medical procedures to legislative bills. As in these examples, the advantage of a committee is, perhaps, most obvious when the alternative being considered is complex in that it has
We thank Arjada Bardhi, Navin Kartik, and seminar participants at ASSET (Florence), Cincinnati, Duke, Lisbon, and SMU for helpful comments. Financial supports from the Spanish Ministry for Science and Innovation, grant #ECO2016/000455/001, (Name-Correa) and the Dean's Research Fund at Duke University (Yildirim) are greatly appreciated. Any remaining error is our sole responsibility. multiple attributes, each of which requires an "expert" analysis. And to the extent that experts share their information, the committee will make a better decision. There are, however, two potential problems: First, information is likely to be private; and second, each committee member is likely to be "biased" or "partisan" toward his field of specialty in that he favors his own information. 1 In addition to specialization, such partisanship may be due to representing different constituencies as with the members of a Congressional committee, or due to having different cultural and cognitive backgrounds that distort one's processing of others' information. 2 In this paper, we investigate the optimal composition of committee given the voting procedure, contending that the latter is predetermined in the law or bylaw long before the arrival of a specific issue and the ad-hoc committee to consider it. To this end, we ask: given the majority rule, will a social-minded principal who equally values all aspects of the alternative appoint more or less biased experts to the committee? How will her choice depend on the majority rule as well as her (potential) status quo bias? Does the principal always prefer a fully informed committee? Or will she restrict members' access to information or else form a smaller committee than the number of attributes in the alternative?
To answer these and related questions, we employ a model of collective decision with payoff interdependencies; see, e.g., Yildirim (2012) , Moldovanu and Shi (2013) , and Roesler (2015) . Specifically, an uninformed principal forms a panel of experts who vote between a multi-dimensional alternative, e.g., an interdisciplinary project, and status quo according to a fixed majority rule. Prior to the vote, each expert receives private information about the "quality" of one dimension of the alternative, but he may also value others. The expert's weight on his own information is commonly known, perhaps through previous interactions, and captures his specialization bias or partisanship. We study how this bias affects equilibrium voting, and in turn, the expected payoff of the principal, e.g., the university administrator, who cares about the average quality of the alternative vis-a-vis the status quo. Unlike the experts, the principal possesses a status quo bias, potentially borne by the organizational cost of implementing the alternative.
Our main finding is that the optimal committee composition crucially depends on the ma- 1 For instance, in medicine, Jang et. al (2010) report that one-third of prostate cancer patients who had only seen a urologist underwent prostate surgery while radiation therapy was the most common treatment for those patients who visited both a urologist and a radiation oncologist. Indeed, a multidisciplinary team approach is being increasingly recommended and adopted in many areas of healthcare (Schuetz et al., 2010) . 2 The latter is often used for explaining why agents may "agree to disagree"; e.g. Morris (1995) .
jority rule and does so non-monotonically. In particular, if the majority requirement for the alternative is weak, the principal wants the least partisan experts in the committee whereas if the majority requirement is moderate, she wants the most partisan. For the remaining majority rules, those close to unanimity, the principal prefers modestly partisan experts. To understand, note that valuing all aspects of the alternative equally, i.e., its average quality, the principal would not care about the committee composition if she could control how its members vote, i.e., if she could contract on their approval standards. In practice though, such control is infeasible since members hold private information. Instead, the principal may try to influence their equilibrium voting by their composition. We show that less partisan experts, those who place a greater weight on others' information, vote more strategically:
conditional on the information gleaned from the pivotal event, they are more willing to ignore their own. 3 When the alternative requires few affirmative votes for approval, the pivotal event carries negative news, leading a less partisan expert to raise his approval standard and do so toward the principal's desired level. In contrast, when the alternative requires an intermediate number of affirmative votes, the pivotal event carries positive news, leading a less partisan expert to lower his approval standard. To prevent such divergence from her desired standard, the principal appoints more partisan experts who place less weight on the pivotal event. Finally, when the alternative requires a strong consensus for approval, the principal strikes a balance between the two cases and appoints a moderately partisan experts. Overall, given the majority rule, the principal manages the amount of strategic voting in the committee by its composition, and uses it to her advantage to bring members' approval standards closer to her preferred level. The committee composition depends also on the principal's status quo bias: the stronger it is, the more partisan members she wants in the committee to lower the chances of the alternative's approval.
Next, we extend our model to include uninformed experts; perhaps, they lacked the time or access for a thorough evaluation of the alternative before the vote. Fully characterizing the equilibrium voting, we observe that by making their votes the least pivotal, the uninformed members delegate the decision to the informed. In particular, the uninformed reject the alternative when the majority requirement is weak; accept when it is strong; and strictly mix in between. The strict mixing by the uninformed occurs because the pivotal event conveys no news in equilibrium, which also induces the informed to vote sincerely or nonstrategically independent of their partisanship. Hence, the presence of uninformed members reduces the 3 Needless to say, the pivotal event is the vote profile for which one's vote is decisive.
principal's ability to influence informed voters by their composition. Put differently, the committee's composition is more important for the principal when experts are more likely to be informed.
Does this, however, mean that the principal wants the experts to be all informed? Interestingly, not always. We show that when the principal cannot pick optimally biased experts to the committee, perhaps they are unavailable in the population, she may prefer some to be uninformed. Though the uninformed experts decrease the quality of the decision, they help bring the alternative's approval rate closer to the optimum owing to their incentives to delegate. This implies that the principal may sometimes raise -not lower -the cost of information for committee members, perhaps by limiting their access to information or by rushing the vote on the alternative. By the same token, we also show that if the principal cannot restrict the committee's access to information, she may optimally appoint one smaller than required by the alternative; i.e., the principal may not consult an expert for each dimension of the alternative.
Related Literature. Building on the Condorcet Jury Theorem, there is an extensive literature on voting as a means of information aggregation in committees; e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) . This line of research typically assumes that committee members have a common interest: if their information were public, they would agree on the best outcome. Our paper is, therefore, more related to a growing strand of this literature in which committee members have conflicting interests, formalized as interdependent valuations, in that each is biased or partisan toward his own information.
Using this specification, Yildirim (2012) identifies credible majority rules if a social planner cannot commit to one ex ante. Focusing on ad-hoc committees, we fix the voting rule here as an institution but examine the optimal partisanship and informed voting in the committee.
Roesler (2015) introduces privately known partisanships and shows that under the unanimity rule, each member relaxes his equilibrium approval standard as the rest of the group becomes stochastically more partisan. Unlike her (and keeping up with most other studies), we assume symmetric and commonly known partisanship to explore the planner's preference for it depending on the majority rule. In doing so, we also establish the important link between approval standards and the majority rule. 4 In a dynamic model, Moldovanu and Shi (2013) study collective search under a unanimous agreement, and compare equilibrium acceptance 4 It is worth noting that Roesler's result for the unanimity rule is not at odds with our Proposition 1(c) below, because, under symmetry, we find the total effect of partisanship on a player's equilibrium strategy. standards across specialist and "generalist" members. 5 In a somewhat different specification with single-peaked preferences and interdependent bliss points, Gruner and Kiel (2004) and Rosar (2015) compare social performances of mean and median aggregation rules for (continuous) reports. They find that the mean aggregation rule dominates if members are not too partisan or the committee is large enough. Here, we restrict attention to binary reports, i.e., votes, but consider more general aggregation rules.
In highlighting the need for biased experts to improve decision-making, our paper is also related to those that emphasize their role in acquiring costly information; e.g. Unlike theirs, our model features costless information. As such, our paper is more related to those that emphasize the role of biased experts in increasing information transmission in persuasion and cheap-talk games with exogenous information; e.g., Shin (1998), Krishna and Morgan (2001) , and Battacharya and Mukherjee (2013). These papers allow for more general communication between experts and the decision-maker than simple votes, but they restrict attention to two-expert committees, in which majority rule is not crucial. An exception in this regard is Li and Suen (2004) who consider simple votes between two biased experts but do not explore the issue of the optimal composition, which would result in appointing unbiased experts in their setting. 6 Similar to ours, there are also several papers that point to the optimality of having uninformed committee members. Among them, Caillaud and Tirole (2007) and Bardhi and Guo (2018) argue that the sponsor of a proposal may best persuade a group by selectively informing some members and relying on rubber-stamping by the uninformed. Although the uninformed also rubber-stamp in equilibrium in our extended model, their presence is desired by a social-minded principal -not by a self-interested sponsor. Gershkov and Szentes (2009) show that a utilitarian planner may optimally decide under imprecise information as it becomes harder to motivate an additional expert to acquire costly information. Without the latter concern, however, the planner would prefer to have all informed experts in their model. Battacharya and Mukherjee (2013) examine a persuasion game without commitment and find that when experts are moderately biased toward a policy, increasing their likelihood of being 5 Previous papers by Albrecht et al. (2010) and Compte and Jehiel (2010) allow for more general majority rules in a collective search model but restrict attention to pure private values, i.e., to the most partisan members. Aside from their focus, none of these dynamic models reduces to our static analysis of equilibrium voting. 6 We should point out that unlike this set of papers, each expert in our model is ex ante biased toward his own information (or specialty) -not toward a specific alternative or policy, though this is inessential for our results; see Footnotes 9 and 13. informed may lead to worse outcomes as it affects the decision-maker's default policy and experts' disclosure strategies in equilibrium. In our model, the majority rule is fixed so the lack of commitment is not the source of having uninformed members. Last, but not least, Name-Correa and Yildirim (2016) conclude that when the committee is susceptible to outside influence, increasing its size may help deter capture even though new members are expected to remain uninformed and rubber-stamp.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we lay out the model, followed by the characterization of equilibrium voting in Section 3. In Section 4, we study the principal's preference for the committee composition. In Section 5, we extend the analysis to committees with potentially uninformed members and study the principal's preference for a fully informed committee. Section 6 concludes. All proofs and auxiliary results are relegated to an appendix.
The Model
An uninformed principal, say a university administrator, must decide between status quo and a complex, multi-dimensional alternative, e.g., a multi-disciplinary project, by appointing an ad-hoc committee of n > 1 interested experts, e.g., faculty representatives from various academic units. Based on his specialization, expert i can evaluate the quality of only one dimension, which yields a private signal θ i independently drawn from a twice continuously differentiable distribution F, with mean 0 and a positive density f on the support θ < 0 < θ.
Besides his own, however, expert i may also value others' signals about the alternative as we formalize by the following interdependent payoff:
The interdependence parameter β 2 [0, 1] is commonly known and captures the degree of specialization bias or partisanship: the higher β is, the more an expert cares about his dimension of the alternative, with β = 0 and β = 1 referring to the committees with the least and the most partisan members, respectively. 7 The status quo yields a normalized payoff of 0 to each expert. 
That is, the principal, representing the organization, cares about the average quality of the alternative, weighing its dimensions equally. 8 If the alternative is rejected, the principal obtains a fixed payoff w 0 0; so, unlike the experts, she may have a status quo bias. 9 As is common in the literature, given ex ante symmetric players, we solve for symmetric (Bayesian-Nash) equilibria of the voting game. To eliminate trivial equilibria associated with nonunanimous rules, however, we also require them to be responsive or interior. 10 We begin our analysis by characterizing equilibrium voting and then proceed to the principal's preference for the committee's composition, namely, for the parameter β.
Equilibrium voting
Since signals are independent and v A i is strictly increasing in θ i , it is readily verified that expert i follows a cutoff strategy: approve the project if θ i > θ i , and disapprove if θ i < θ i . 11 In a symmetric equilibrium, suppose that all but expert i adopt a cutoff θ . In determining his, expert i needs to consider only the pivotal event in which there are exactly k 1 approval and n k disapproval votes except for his. Conditional on this event, (1) implies that expert i's expected payoff is:
where
tutes an (interior) equilibrium if and only if it satisfies the following indifference condition:
Lemma 1 There is a unique symmetric equilibrium.
The equilibrium existence is by continuity. Its uniqueness follows from the fact that both
, are strictly increasing in the cutoff, x.
To understand equilibrium voting strategies, it is useful to introduce the notion of sincere or nonstrategic voting. Expert i is said to vote sincerely if he conditions his vote only on his private information (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1996) . Absent any status quo bias for the experts, sincere voting corresponds to adopting a cutoff of 0 in our model. 12 It is immediate from (4) that voting is always sincere for the most partisan (pure private-value) experts, i.e.,
For the rest, Proposition 1 shows that equilibrium voting is generically strategic and depends crucially on the degree of partisanship.
The threshold rule κ is the real solution to: θ (k, β) = 0. If integer, it induces sincere voting for all β. Generically though, κ is noninteger except for special cases; e.g., when n is odd and the signal distribution is symmetric so that κ = n+1 2 -the simple majority. Part (a) confirms that a positive (resp. negative) vote, on average, carries positive (resp. negative) news about the alternative. Given this, part (b) says that when the majority rule requires more approval votes for the alternative, agents relax their own approval standards as they hold a more favorable view of others' opinions in the event of being pivotal. Part (c) reveals that for any k, an increase in β moves the equilibrium threshold closer to 0, the sincere voting threshold, because agents put less weight on the pivotal event.
Part (c) can also inform us how the approval probability of the alternative changes with the degree of partisanship. Note that for an arbitrary cutoff x 2 [θ, θ], the alternative is approved with the probability:
Corollary 1 follows because ∂P(x; k)/∂x < 0. It says that the chances of the alternative's acceptance decrease (resp. increase) with the partisanship if a sufficiently strong (resp. weak) consensus is required.
Armed with experts' voting behavior, we next examine the principal's preference for their composition, i.e., β.
Committee composition
Note that conditional on an arbitrary cutoff x and the vote profile with m Yes votes, the principal's ex post payoff from implementing the project is:
and in turn, using (5), her ex ante payoff before a committee vote is:
where the first term on the right-hand side of (7) is her expected payoff from the alternative's acceptance and the second term is her expected payoff from its rejection. 13 Before characterizing the principal's payoff under equilibrium voting, we establish a benchmark of optimal voting. Suppose that the principal could dictate the cutoff x such that expert i accepts the alternative whenever θ i > x. Then, the principal would solve the following program:
Lemma 2 There is a unique solution,
The existence of a solution is immediate since w(x; .) is continuous. Its uniqueness is due to the latter's single-peakedness in x, as established in Lemma A2. Intuitively, a higher cutoff raises the average quality of the accepted alternative but it also lowers the probability of acceptance. An interior cutoff means that the principal meaningfully delegates the decision 13 Clearly, (7) is equivalent to:
So, as alluded to above, w 0 can be interpreted as the principal's cost of implementing the alternative.
to the committee. And Lemma 2 shows that she will delegate if her status quo bias is not too severe, which is more likely to be the case for a voting rule closer to unanimity. Otherwise, it would be optimal for the principal to set the highest standard for a Yes vote, i.e., θ o = θ, ensuring the rejection of the alternative. Building on Lemma 2, the next result characterizes the optimal voting strategy, especially its relation to the majority rule.
and strictly increasing in w 0 ; and
.
Part (a) of Proposition 2 indicates that the principal with a stronger status quo bias would ask experts to raise their approval standards for the alternative. She would also ask them for higher approval standards if the majority rule is less demanding for the alternative. Refining these observations, part (b) identifies the critical rule which, if integer, would render sincere voting optimal for the principal. Since, unlike the experts, the principal has a status quo bias, her critical rule for sincere voting requires more approval votes than the experts', i.e., κ o (w 0 ) κ . In fact, it is readily checked that κ o (w 0 ) is strictly increasing in w 0 . 14 An important feature of the optimal voting strategy, θ o (k, w 0 ), is that it is independent of the specialization bias, β. That is, weighing each dimension of the alternative equally, the principal would not be concerned about the committee's composition if she could control how its members vote. In practice, though, the principal lacks such control as expert evaluations are private. Instead, the principal may try to influence the equilibrium voting by appointing a committee with more or less partisan specialists. Combining the previous two, the next proposition offers a sharp characterization of the principal's preference for commit-
ante payoff under equilibrium voting strategies.
, where β(.) 2 [0, 1) is strictly decreasing in k and strictly increasing in w 0 .
Proposition 3 reveals that the principal's preference for committee composition depends critically on the majority rule. If the majority rule is relatively lenient toward the alternative, i.e., k < κ , the principal wants less partisan specialists in the committee. This is because, with only few affirmative votes required for the approval of the alternative, the principal desires a high approval standard, θ o > 0. And by Proposition 1, less partisan experts, gleaning negative news from the pivotal event and placing more weight on it, serve this purpose by raising their equilibrium voting cutoffs toward the desired level. If, on the other hand, the majority requirement is moderate, then the principal wants more partisan specialists. Although the principal still aims for a high approval standard in this case, less partisan experts, now gleaning positive news from the pivotal event, would lower their cutoffs, diverging from the optimal level. Finally, if the majority requirement is sufficiently stringent for the alternative,
i.e., k > κ o (w 0 ), both the principal and members would apply low approval standards, i.e., θ o < 0 and θ < 0, and the two would coincide for some moderately partisan experts. The monotonicity of the principal's payoff is due to the single-peakedness identified in Lemma 2.
Overall, Proposition 3 reveals that by forming a committee with more or less partisan members, the principal controls the amount of strategic voting among them, and in doing so, she brings the equilibrium voting standard closer to her optimum. In fact, if, for each dimension of the alternative, the principal has access to multiple experts with any degree of partisanship, the following result, which is immediate from Proposition 3, shows her optimal choice.
Corollary 2 (Optimal composition)
Three observations are in order. First, the optimal committee composition is non-monotonic in the majority rule, k. While, for a low k, the principal would appoint a committee with the least partisan and hence the most strategic specialists, she would do the opposite for an intermediate k: appoint a committee with the most partisan specialists who would vote sincerely.
For a high k, she would strike a balance between the two cases, with the optimal bias, β(.), decreasing in k.
Second, given that both κ o (w 0 ) and β(k, w 0 ) are increasing in w 0 , the optimal committee would involve (weakly) more partisan experts as the principal becomes more status quo biased. In doing so, the principal decreases the chances of the alternative's acceptance (see Corollary 1) . It is also intuitive, though not obvious, that if, like the experts, the principal had no status quo bias, i.e., w 0 = 0, then she would always want a committee with the least biased members, i.e., β o = 0, whose objective would match the principal's. 15 And third, the ability to compose the committee is most useful to the principal when the majority requirement is sufficiently strong; i.e., when
. Otherwise, the equilibrium approval standard remains too low for the principal. 16 We illustrate Corollary 2 by an example.
Example 1 Let n = 11, w 0 = 3/11, and θ i U [ 1, 1] . Then, κ = 6 and κ o = 9. Hence, β o = 0 for k < 6; β o = 1 for 6 < k 9, and β o = 18/(11k 81) for 9 < k 11.
We close this section by noting that isomorphic results are easily obtained for the principal with a negative status quo bias, i.e., w 0 < 0. In particular, noticing from Proposition 2 that κ o (w 0 ) < κ in this case, the following corollary to Proposition A1 is immediate for the optimal committee composition.
Corollary 3 (Negative status quo bias) Suppose w 0 < 0. Then,
Imperfectly informed committees
Up to now, we have assumed that before the vote, each expert learns the quality of his dimension of the alternative. In reality though, some experts may remain uninformed, perhaps they lacked the time or access for a thorough investigation. The presence of such members in the committee is likely to affect the equilibrium voting for all, and in turn, the principal's preference for biased experts. In this section, we first determine the optimal composition of imperfectly informed committees, and then investigate if the principal wants a fully informed committee.
Committee composition with uninformed members
Let expert i receive his private signal θ i with an independent probability λ 2 (0, 1), and remain uninformed otherwise. Also let an uninformed committee member approve the alternative with probability π 2 [0, 1] while an informed member follows a cutoff strategy
as in the base model. Then, the ex ante probability that a member approves the alternative is:
From (9) 
As a result, the total expected value of others' signals in the pivotal event can be written:
Let (θ , π ) be the pair of voting strategies in a symmetric equilibrium. As in (4), given π , the (interior) cutoff signal θ must leave an informed expert indifferent between accepting and rejecting the alternative in the pivotal event, namely
As for the uninformed, since E[θ] = 0 for their own signals, π must satisfy the following best response to θ :
In words, an uninformed member approves the alternative if the pivotal event carries positive news, and disapproves if it carries negative news. It is, however, possible that the pivotal event carries no news in equilibrium, i.e., h(.) = 0. In this case, (12) implies sincere voting by the informed experts, and solving h(0, π ; k, λ) = 0 for π , we find the randomized strategy for the uninformed. 17 It is readily verified that the randomized strategy is feasible, i.e., π 2
Lemma 3 κ l (λ) is increasing and κ h (λ) is decreasing in λ, with κ l (1) = κ h (1) = κ , and κ l (0) = 1 and κ h (0) = n.
The characterization of the equilibrium voting is then obtained from (12), (13), and (14) .
There is a unique symmetric equilibrium, and it has these properties:
Moreover, (a) π is independent of β, and (b) ∂θ /∂β
The existence of a symmetric equilibrium follows from the fact that h(x, π; k, λ) is continuous in x. Unlike in the base model (with λ = 1), however, its uniqueness is not immediate because for λ < 1, the conditional expectations E + [x, π; λ] and E [x, π; λ], and in turn, h(x, π; k, λ) are, in general, non-monotonic in x. 18 Nevertheless, we establish their monotonicity on the equilibrium path, leading us to the uniqueness. 19 Inspecting the equilibrium strategies, it is interesting to observe that uninformed members essentially delegate the decision to the informed. To understand, consider k = 1 and k = n, under which the alternative is either 17 In solving h(0, π ; k, λ) = 0, note that (10) given E[θ] = 0. 18 As shown in Lemma A3, we have that
The latter is, in itself, interesting and would not obtain for λ = 1. It says that all else equal, an informed expert's raising his already high approval standard reduces the expected value of a Yes vote. The reason is that the Yes vote is more likely to have come from an uninformed expert in this case. 19 Lemma A3 shows that E + [x, π; λ] is strictly increasing in x when x > 0 and π = 0, or when x < 0 and π = 1. Similar properties hold for E [x, π; λ].
accepted by one Yes vote or rejected by one No vote, respectively. In each case, the uninformed make their votes nonpivotal by always rejecting the alternative for k = 1 and always accepting it for k = n. This equilibrium strategy is also consistent for an intermediate k since π is strictly increasing in k; that is, the uninformed are more likely to cast Yes votes as the majority requirement becomes stronger.
Next, we observe that unlike in the base model, the presence of uninformed members induce sincere voting by the informed for a nontrivial region of majority rules, i.e., θ = 0
In fact, given the properties of κ l (λ) and κ h (λ) in Lemma 3, sincere voting by the informed becomes more prevalent as the fraction of the uninformed grows. As mentioned above, the reason is that with a significant fraction of the uninformed, the pivotal event carries no significant news in equilibrium to compel an informed expert to ignore his own signal. Last, but not least, while the committee composition, β, does not affect the voting behavior of the uninformed experts, it affects that of the informed as in the base model whenever they vote strategically, i.e., whenever θ 6 = 0. Hence, when forming the committee, the principal targets the informed members.
To characterize the optimal committee composition, we modify the baseline analysis (with w 0 0), and note that conditional on the vote profile with m Yes votes, the principal's ex post welfare is given by:
and in turn, her ex ante welfare before the vote is:
As a result, the principal's ex ante payoff under the equilibrium strategies is:
Clearly, w (.) is independent of β for κ l (λ) k κ h (λ). That is, the principal is neutral to the committee composition for moderately strong majority rules, since gleaning no significant news from the pivotal event, the informed members always vote sincerely in this region. To determine how w (.) changes with β for the remaining, more extreme majority rules, we consider an auxiliary problem, much like (8) , in which given π (.), the principal optimally sets the cutoff for the informed experts: 20 
where e β(.) =
Moreover, e β(.) is strictly decreasing in k and λ, and strictly increasing in w 0 .
Proposition 5 extends Corollary 1. As alluded to above, the key difference is that when the committee is imperfectly informed, the principal is neutral to its composition for a nontrivial set of majority rules:
In other words, the composition of an imperfectly informed committee is important to the principal only for extreme voting rules such as the unanimity.
Optimally informed committee
In light of Lemma 3, Proposition 5 also implies that the principal has less influence over a less informed committee through its composition: the uninformed members delegate the decision to the informed and the informed members vote sincerely regardless of their partisanships. This observation, however, raises the following question: does the principal prefer a fully informed committee, i.e., λ = 1? Interestingly, not always. As the next proposition demonstrates for the unanimity rule, the principal may prefer some uninformed members in the committee -especially when the committee composition is suboptimal. Note from Corollary 2 that under the unanimity rule, β(.) 2 [0, 1) is the optimal bias the principal wants for informed experts. Part (a) says that when the principal can optimally choose the committee composition, i.e., members with β(.) are available in the population, she indeed prefers them to be all informed. Part (b) says that when the committee members are too biased for the principal, she prefers some to be uninformed if the committee is sufficiently large. To see why, recall first from Proposition 4 that under the unanimity rule, the uninformed members delegate the decision to the informed by always approving the alternative: while lowering the quality of the decision, the uninformed members do not block it, either. Second, recall from Lemma 4 that given the strategy of the uninformed members, the principal wants the informed to relax their approval standard below the sincere cutoff of 0, i.e., e θ o (.) < 0. In doing so, she aims to prevent a single informed expert with a slightly negative signal to vote down an otherwise high quality alternative -an externality that is clearly stronger in a larger committee. The principal cannot, however, implement her optimal approval standard for informed experts when they are the most biased and thus vote sincerely, i.e, θ (.) = 0 for β = 1. To counter this and increase the chances of the alternative's approval, the principal, therefore, (stochastically) introduces uninformed members, perhaps by limiting the committee's access to information or time to process it before the vote. Hence, when deciding to introduce uninformed members, the principal strikes a balance between raising the alternative's approval probability and the quality of the decision. Part (b) simply reveals that when the committee is large enough, the former effect dominates since the voting externality is then sufficiently strong; otherwise, the principal prefers a committee with all informed experts to improve the quality of the decision. The fact that the principal's status quo bias, w o , plays a role in this finding is also intuitive: only a relatively status quo biased principal would worry about the alternative's approval. In fact, from the proof of Proposition 6, it is immediate that λ o is strictly increasing in w 0 (see (A-18)); that is, a less status quo biased principal prefers a less informed committee to control for the voting externality among the informed members.
Proposition 6 (Optimal information)
Proposition 6 suggests that when the principal cannot reduce the committee's access to information or rush the vote on the alternative, she may, instead, appoint a smaller committee than the number of attributes in the alternative. That is, the principal may consult fewer experts than the alternative requires for a fully informed decision. Ignoring the trivial rounding issues, the following result shows this possibility.
Proposition 7 (Optimal committee size) Suppose k = n and β = 1. Then, the optimal committee size is:
n, n .
Two insights emerge from Proposition 7. First, the optimal committee can be quite small.
For instance, when w 0 = 0 and F(0) = 1 2 , we have m o 2, independent of n. This means that the alternative will be considered without an expert input on n 2 of its dimensions. Second, somewhat ironically, the principal with a stronger status quo bias forms a larger committee, and thus, reaches a more informed decision. The reason is that under the unanimity rule, the alternative is also less likely to be approved by a larger committee of informed experts.
Together, Propositions 6 and 7 reveal that information design for the committee can be as valuable a tool for the principal as its composition. As such, it relates to several studies discussed in the introduction, especially Caillaud and Tirole (2007) and Bardhi and Guo (2018) .
In different settings, these authors also discover that a committee may be best persuaded by selectively informing some members and relying on rubber-stamping by the uninformed. Although the uninformed also rubber-stamp in our extended model, their presence is desired by a social-minded principal -not by a self-interested sponsor whose sole objective is the approval of her proposal. Moreover, Proposition 7 adds that if possible, the principal may seek the opinions of only a subset of the interested experts.
Conclusion
Decision-making by committee is a staple of democratic organizations. While organizations often set the voting rule, be it simple majority or unanimity, in their laws or bylaws long before the arrival of any specific issue, they have flexibility as to who should be on the adhoc committee to consider it. Such flexibility may be especially pronounced when committee members are experts with varying degrees of specialization biases: each can evaluate the issue from the viewpoint of his expertise but also puts more weight on his viewpoint. In this paper, building on the recent models of committees with interdependent payoffs, we have studied the effect of committee composition on the collective decision.
We have discovered that the optimal composition depends non-monotonically on the majority rule: if a weak majority is required for the approval of the alternative, a social-minded principal prefers the least biased members, who equally weigh others' information (or possess pure common values), in the committee whereas if the majority requirement is moderate, she prefers the most biased (who possess pure private values). And for the remaining majority rules, those closer to unanimity, the principal prefers modestly biased members. As mentioned before, the intuition comes from the fact that the majority rule determines how much a committee member learns from the pivotal event, and the bias (or the degree of payoff interdependence) determines how much he cares about this event so as to ignore his own signal. Hence, by choosing its composition, the principal chooses the amount of strategic voting in the committee to implement her optimal approval standard. We have also discovered that the principal who has a stronger status quo bias, perhaps borne by the organizational cost of implementing the alternative, wants more biased members. In doing so, she ensures that the alternative is not easily accepted.
By extending the analysis, we have found that the committee composition is less important when its members can be uninformed. The reason is that learning little from the pivotal event in this case, informed members vote less strategically, regardless of their specialty biases. Nevertheless, when the committee composition is not optimal, we show that the principal may prefer some members to be uninformed, perhaps by limiting the committee's access to information or time to process it before the vote. We have also found that when the committee's access to information cannot be restricted, the principal may alternatively appoint a smaller committee than the alternative requires for a fully informed decision. That is, the principal may not include an expert in the committee for every dimension of the alternative.
In closing, we note one future extension: unlike in our model, committee members may be heterogeneously biased, putting different weights on others' information. While this extension appears nontrivial for nonunanimous voting rules, we show in Lemma A5 that for the unanimity rule, the principal would optimally pick members with homogenous biases under a mild distributional assumption.
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Proof of Lemma 1. Note first that v A i = θ i for β = 1. Hence, θ = 0 is the unique equilibrium. Next, suppose β < 1 and let V(x; k, β)
In addition, since (with appropriate limit arguments for x = θ and θ)
it also follows that V x (x; k, β) > 0, where subscripts, henceforth, refer to partial derivatives.
From these three facts, there exists a unique interior solution, θ (k, β), to V(x; k, β) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let β < 1. To prove part (a), suppose, to the contrary, that
Next, recall from the proof of Lemma 1 that V(x; k, β) is strictly increasing in x and in k.
To prove part (c), we differentiate both sides of (4) with respect to β:
Finally, treating k as a continuous variable and solving V(0; k, β) = 0 for k, we find
and in turn, κ = 1 + (n 1)[1 F(0)], as stated in the proposition. Clearly, θ (κ , β) = 0.
Hence, by part (b), θ (k, β) > 0 for k < κ , and θ (k, β) < 0 for k > κ .
Before proving Corollary 1 and Lemma 2, we prove two auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma A1. Let w A (x, k) = ∑ n m=k p(x; m, n)w A (x, m) and P(x, k) = ∑ n m=k p(x; m, n) denote the principal's expected payoff from the accepted alternative and the probability of its acceptance, respectively, where p(x; m, n) = (
Proof. For conciseness, let φ 1 F(x) in this proof. Part (a) follows because simple algebra shows
For part (b), we re-write
Given that E[θ] = 0, we obtain the desired expression:
or equivalently,
To prove part (c), recall φ 1 F(x) and differentiate (A-3) with respect to x:
which substituting back for φ 1 F(x) produces the stated expression for w A x (x; k). Lemma A2. w(x; k, w 0 ) is single-peaked in x 2 (θ, θ). Suppose x 2 (θ, θ) . By Lemma A1, the ex ante payoff in (7) can be re-stated:
Proof.
Differentiating with respect to x, we find
Since P x (.) < 0 for x 2 (θ, θ),
where by (A-1) . As a result,
which establishes that w(x; .) is strictly quasi-concave or single-peaked in x.
Proof of Corollary 1. Directly follows from Lemma A1(a) and Proposition 1(c).
Proof of Lemma 2. From (A-7), note that
Hence, there is a unique interior solution, 
Inserting (A-2) into (A-9), we find
Setting x = 0 in (A-8) and solving H(0, k) = nw 0 for k, we obtain
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose k 2 [1, κ ). Then, by Propositions 1(c) and 2(b), we have
where the equality is due to (A-8) and the fact that (4) can be re-stated as:
In this case, the optimal voting can be implemented in equilibrium for some β. To find it, we set θ (k, β) = θ o (k, w 0 ) and employ (A-8), simplifying (4) to:
and yielding 
Hence, by the single-peakedness, w (k, β) is strictly increasing in β for β < β(k, w 0 ) and strictly decreasing in β for β > β(k, w 0 ), as claimed. Proof. The proof mimics that of Proposition 3. In particular, substituting w 0 for w 0 , it is evident from (A-6) that w(x; .) continues to be single-peaked but now κ o (w 0 ) < κ .
Proof of Corollary 2.
Immediate from Proposition A1.
Proof of Lemma 3. Immediate from (14).
Lemma A3. E + [x, π; λ] and E [x, π; λ] are both increasing in x if one of the following holds: (1) x > 0 and π = 0; (2) x < 0 and π = 1; or (3) x = 0.
Proof. Using (9) and (10), simple differentiation reveals that 
In what follows, let
as defined in (11) .
Proof of Proposition 4. The equilibrium characterization is by construction. Let β < 1 and suppose first that h(θ , π ; k, λ) = 0. Then, θ = 0 by (12) , and solving h(0, π ; k, λ) = 0,
. Since π is strictly increasing in k, π 2 [0, 1] if and only if
where κ l (.) and κ h (.) are as defined in (14) . Next, take k < κ l (λ). Then, π = 0 or 1. Suppose π = 1. Then, h(θ , 1; k, λ) > 0, which, from (12), implies θ < 0. Now note the following two properties:
for all x; and (2) by Lemma A3, h(x, 1; k, λ) is strictly increasing in x for x 0.
Therefore,
where the equality follows from the definition of κ l (λ). Hence, h(θ , 1; k, λ) < 0 -a contradiction. This means that π = 0 for k < κ l (λ). Then, h(θ , 0; .) < 0 and in turn, θ > 0. To show that for k < κ l (λ), such an equilibrium exists and it is unique, note from (A-10) that
On the other hand, we also have
Finally, totally differentiating with respect to β, we find that for k < κ l (λ),
Together with the fact that π = 0 is independent of β, the proof is complete for k < κ l (λ).
A similar line of argument also proves the claims in the proposition for k > κ h (λ), and the claims in parts (a) and (b) trivially hold for κ l (λ) k κ h (λ) since both π and θ are independent of β in this region of k.
Proof of Lemma 4. We first show that for
, as defined in Lemma 4, uniquely solves
To do so, let e κ be a solution to (A-11). We first prove that e κ > κ h . Suppose, to the contrary, that e κ κ h . In particular, suppose e κ 2 [κ l , κ h ]. Then, θ = 0 by Proposition 4, and in turn, h(0, π (e κ, λ); e κ, λ) = 0 by (12) -a contradiction. Next, suppose e κ < κ l . Then, π (e κ, λ) = π (κ l , λ) = 0 by Proposition 4, and because h(0, 0; k, λ) is strictly increasing in k, h(0, 0; e κ, λ) < h(0, 0; κ l , λ) = 0 < nw 0 -a contradiction. Hence, e κ > κ h , which implies π (e κ, λ) = 1. Given that h(0, 1; k, λ) is also strictly increasing in k , there is a unique k that solves h(0, 1; k, λ) = nw 0 .
Recalling, by definition, that
we find
Though not obvious from the definition of κ h (λ) in (14) , it can also be written as:
, as claimed. For w 0 = 0, there is a trivial multiplicity for e κ since (A-11) holds for any k 2 κ l , κ h in this case. To see this, using a similar to the case with w 0 > 0, we can rule out e κ < κ l . Suppose e κ > κ h . Then, π (e κ, λ) = 1 and in turn, 0 = h(0, 1; κ h , λ) < h(0, 1; e κ, λ) = 0, a contradiction. Hence, e κ 2 κ l , κ h . For consistency, however, we set e κ o (0, λ) = κ h (λ). 
and
By mimicking the proof of Lemma A1 (b), it is readily established that
Moreover, by mimicking the proof of Lemma A1 (c), we find that
Differentiating w(x, π (k, λ); w 0 , λ) with respect to x as in the proof of Lemma A2, we, therefore, obtain
Suppose that for a given k, e θ o (.) solves w x (x; .) = 0, or equivalently
To establish that e θ o (.) > 0 for k < e κ o , suppose, to the contrary, that e θ o (.) < 0 for some
Thus, by (A-14), h( e θ o (k, w 0 , λ), 1; k, λ) > nw 0 for any k 2 (κ h , e κ o ). Now note the following
is strictly increasing in k; and (2) by Lemma A3, h(x, 1; k, λ) is strictly increasing in x for x 0. These facts imply that
Next consider k > e κ o . Given that h x (0, 1; e κ o , λ) > 0 and h(x, π; k, λ) is strictly increasing in k, we have e θ o (k, w 0 , λ) < 0 for k close enough to e κ o . Moreover, since, by Lemma A3,
Then, by Proposition 4, π = 0 and π = 1, respectively. By Lemma A3, h x (x, π ; k, λ) > 0 for: (1) k κ l (λ) and x 0; (2) k e κ o (w 0 , λ) and x 0. Using (A-13), we, therefore, have
proving the single-peakedness. 
Since θ β (.) < 0 in this region of k, the single-peakedness identified in the proof of Lemma A4
implies that w (.) is strictly decreasing in β.
Given that (i) by Lemma A3, h x (x, 1; k, λ) > 0 whenever x 0, and (ii) h(x, 1; k, λ) is increasing in k, we have that w x (x; .) is strictly increasing in x. Thus, since θ (k, β, λ) < 0 and For notational convenience, let θ (n, e β(n, w 0 , λ), λ) = e θ (n, λ, w 0 ) and e φ (.) = 1 λF( e θ (.)). Clearly, e θ (n, λ, w 0 ) = e θ o (k, w 0 , λ), as defined in (16 n.
Hence,
Lemma A5. Consider the base model with the unanimity rule. If E + [x] x ("mean residual life") is strictly decreasing, then it is optimal for the principal to set the same voting cut-off for all experts.
Proof. Let x i be the cut-off such that expert i votes Yes whenever θ i > x i . Then, under the unanimity rule, the principal's ex ante payoff is given by:
From here, the first-order condition with respect to x j is:
∂w(x; n, w 0 ) Hence, i > 0, or equivalently, 1 F is strictly log-concave, then E + [x] x is strictly decreasing. Together with Lemma 2, Lemma A5 implies that the optimal cut-off is not only symmetric but also unique. To implement this symmetric cutoff in equilibrium, the principal would, therefore, optimally choose homogeneously biased experts, i.e., β i = β. Note that the distributional assumption is not needed in Lemma 2 because the symmetric cut-off is assumed at the outset.
